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RECENT CASE
PROPERTY - A WARRANTY oF HABITABILITY IS IMPLIED BY OPERATION
OF LAW INTO LEASES OF URBAN DWELLING UNITS
The plaintiff-landlord brought an action for possession against the
defendant-tenants for non-payment of rent. The tenants admitted that they
had not paid the rent. They alleged numerous violations of the Housing
Regulations as an equitable defense or a claim by way of recoupment or
set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim, as provided by Rule 4c of the
Landlord and Tenant Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions.' The Landlord and Tenant Branch of the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions rejected the tenants' contention that the landlord
was under a contractual duty to maintain the premises in compliance with
the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affrmed.2 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. Held, a warranty of
habitability, measured by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations
for the District of Columbia, is implied by operation of law into leases of
urban dwelling units, and breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual
remedies for breach of contract. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970).
At common law a lease contained no implied warranty that the premises
were fit for occupancy.3 The tenant took the premises as they were and as-
sumed all risks as to their condition.4 The lessor was under no obligation
to warrant the present or future condition of the leased premises or to re-
pair the premises at the beginning of the term and had no obligation to
make any repairs during the tenancy.5 The rationale for these rules appears
to be threefold. First, the covenants of the common law lease were viewed
as being completely independent. If a landlord covenanted to maintain the
leased structure, his failure to perform had no effect on the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent.6 The breach of a covenant in a lease simply gave rise to an
1. Reported in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3227 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970).
2. Saunders v. First Natl Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968),
afJ'g sub nor. District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.
3. 1 AMERiCAN LAW OF PaopERTY, § 3.45, at 267 (Casner ed. 1952); e.g., Gade v.
National Creamery Co., 324 Mass. 515, 87 N.E.2d 180 (1949).
4. 2 R. PoWErLL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2.33, at 300 (1967); e.g., Civale v.
Meriden Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963).
5. E.g., Grizzle v. Runbeck, 74 Ariz. 92, 244 P.2d 1160 (1952); Kessler v. Grasser,
200 Ky. 89, 187 S.W.2d 1012 (1943); Irish v. Rosenbaum Co., 348 Pa. 194, 34 A.2d 486
(1943).
6. REsrATEmENT OF CoNmAars § 290 (1932). See also Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union
Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del. 1945); Osso v. Rohanna, 187 Pa. 280, 144
A.2d 862 (1958).
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independent suit or counterclaim for damages and it did not suspend the
performance of any of the other covenants. Second, the concept of caveat
emptor shaped the background of the law concerning the condition and
maintenance of leased premises.7 The tenant, by inspecting the premises,
impliedly asserted that he knew the condition of the leasehold. Third, the
law of leases evolved in an agrarian society. In a rural environment the
value of the lease to the tenant lay in the quantity and quality of the land
itself.8 The common law tenant bargained primarily for cultivation rights
and the condition of any structure upon the land was of secondary im-
portance. The process by which this background law has been adapted to
modem conditions has involved many exceptions, some based on judicially
constructed qualifications on the basic doctrine of caveat emptor, others on
statutory enactments, and still others on a complete reappraisal of the as-
sumptions upon which the common law is based.9
Historically, the tenant's obligation to pay rent was absolute, regardless
of the condition of the premises. Only the actual expulsion of the tenant
by the landlord terminated the rental duty. Most courts now, however,
recognize the doctrine of constructive eviction as justification for suspension
of the rental covenant. 10 The increased acceptance of this doctrine seems to
indicate a judicial preference against a strict interpretation of the caveat
emptor rule." In addition, courts have recently begun to hold sellers and
developers of real property responsible for the fitness of their product.' 2
The failure to disclose a known defect in the sale of new or used housing
has been held a sufficient basis for recovery.13 Several courts have held tbat
an implied warranty of habitability exists in the sale of new housing where
the construction of the dwelling was not started or completed at the time
of the contract of sale.14 Other courts have extended the implied warranty
7. 2 R. PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 233, at 300 (1967).
8. See 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITr.AND, THE HISTORY OF ENGuSH LAw 131 (2d ed.
1923).
9. 2 R. POivELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPRTY § 233, at 301 (1967).
10. See Comment, Rent Abatement Legislation: An Answer to Landlords, 12 V"r.
L. REv. 631 (1967).
11. Judges have not been hesitant in expressing their displeasure over the common
law rule of caveat emptor. In Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1952),
dissenting Judge Baezlon said, "I think that rule is an anachronism which has lived
on through stare decisis alone rather than through pragmatic adjustment to 'the felt
necessities of (our) time.' "
12. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sale of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961).
13. Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960); Brooks v. Ervin Constr.
Co., 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
14. Weck v. A & M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 IIl. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728
(1962); Hoye v. Century Builders Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) .
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of fitness doctrine to include completed structures. 15 Courts have also held
builders of new homes liable for breach of an implied warranty that all
local building codes are satisfied.16 Another judicial exception to the rule
of caveat emptor is the implied warranty of habitability for use in the short
term lease of a furnished dwelling.'7 Additionally, recent decisions' 8 and
commentary'0 suggest the possible extension of liability to parties other
than the immediate seller for improper construction of residential real
estate. Despite this trend, many courts have been unwilling to imply war-
ranties of habitability into apartment leases.
20
Recognition of the substandard condition of low income housing has
prompted state legislatures to enact housing codes and regulations. The
purpose of a housing code is to provide an effective method of enforcement
of certain minimum standards deemed essential for human occupancy.2'
The effectiveness of these codes has been questionable. 2 In Pennsylvania,
for example, the tenant's obligation to pay rent is suspended upon certifi-
cation by authorized officials that a dwelling is "unfit for human habita-
tion."23 The tenant is required to pay the withheld amount into an escrow
account until the building is re-certified as "fit for occupation." 24 The
effectiveness of the statute is limited by the fact that withheld monies can-
not be used to make repairs.28 The statute thus provides only a partial
15. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The court said,
. the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements between builder-
vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the
time of the contracting." Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402. See also Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91
Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1969); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development Inc., 83 S.D. 57,
154 NAV.2d 803 (1967); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
16. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Schiro v. W. E. Gould
S. Co., 18 III. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960).
17. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
18. Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
19. Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New
Housing, 35 U. Cm L. Rv. 739 (1968).
20. Rubinger v. Del Monte, 217 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. T. 1961); Susskind v. 1136
Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. City Ct. 1964); Kearse v.
Spaulding, 406 Pa. 140, 170 A.2d 450 (1962).
21. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-701 (1967).
22. One of the few things about which every observer of the slum housing
situation agrees is that present enforcement techniques have been a failure.
The combination of bureaucratic overlapping and understaffing, the use of pro-
cedural delays to the advantage of recalcitrant landlords, and the lack of mili-
tancy by both administrative and judicial officials, have all worked against
the achieving of significant change.
Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 U. Micm. L. Rlv. 869, 915 (1967). See
generally Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAv. L. Rlv. 801 (1965).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-01 (1967).
24. Id. If at the end of six months the building has not been re-certified, the
deposits in the escrow account are repaid to the tenant.
25. See Note, Rent Withholding in Pennsylvania, 30 U. Prir. L. REv. 148 (1968).
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remedy, because the tenant is still not provided with a suitable dwelling.
In other states, the duty of repair and maintenance has been placed on the
lessor by the passage of "repair and deduct laws." 20 "Generally, these
statutes provide that the lessor of a building intended for human occupa-
tion must put it into a condition fit for such use, and repair all subsequent
dilapidations not occasioned by the tenant's own negligence."27 The effec-
tiveness of this type of legislation has also been restricted. In certain states
the cost of repairs is limited to one month's rent.28 Additionally, all of the
"repair and deduct" states expressly permit the landlord to contract away
the statutorily imposed obligation. In New York, the court may stay eviction
proceedings brought for nonpayment of rent upon proof that the conditions
of the premises were such as to constructively evict the tenant.20 The tenant
must deposit the rent due, which may, at the court's discretion, be used for
necessary repairs.80 The conditions necessary to justify a constructive evic-
tion have limited the use of this statute. A judicial attempt to liberalize the
constructive eviction doctrine in New York has been rejected.81
It has been stated that one of the tasks of modem courts is "to divorce
the law of leases from its medieval setting of real .property law and adapt it
to present day conditions and necessities .... ,,32 A number of courts have
felt that the enactment of housing code legislation justifies a judicial re-
view of certain common law doctrines. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Pines v. Perssion3 3 rejected the common law doctrine of caveat emptor with
respect to the lease of a furnished dwelling. In upholding the imposition of
an implied warranty of habitability the court said:
Legislative and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute,
building codes and health regulations, all impose certain duties on
a property owner with respect to the condition of his premises.
Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property
owner-which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. 4
26. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. §§ 42-201 ?1
42-202 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-12-13 (1960); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31, 32
(1952); S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409 & 38.0410 (1939); statutes cited in Comment, infra note 27,
at 312 n.35.
27. Comment, Rent Withholding and Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 304, 312 (1965).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 42-202
(1947).
29. N.Y. REAL PRoP. AcrnONs LAw § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71). Related pro-
ceedings are found in N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAw § 302-a (McKinney Supp. 1970-71) and
N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143-b(2) (McKinney 1966).
30. N.Y. REAL PROP. AMroNs LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
31. See Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. T. 1964).
32. Bennett, The Modern Lease- An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 Th."s L.
REv. 47, 48 (1937).
33. 14 Wisc. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
34. Id. at 595, Ill N.W.2d at 412.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that housing regulations effec-
tively alter the common law rule of no implied warranty of habitability.35
The Supreme Court of Hawaii recently adopted the position that the func-
tion of a lease is to create a contractual as opposed to a tenurial relation-
ship.a0 The court stated:
[A]pplication of an implied warranty of habitability in leases gives
recognition to the changes in leasing transactions today. It affirms
the fact that a lease is, in essence, a sale as well as a transfer of an
estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual relationship.3 7
These cases indicate the increasing judicial concern over the inequalities
perpetuated by antiquated common law rules. The common law doctrine
of no implied warranties of habitability must be judged in the light of
contemporary society, not on the basis of often accepted, but long out-
dated, concepts.
The Javins case reflects this policy decision. The rationale for estab-
lishing an implied warranty of habitability in Javins involves four points.
First, the factual assumptions upon which the common law rules are based
have lost their validity. The court points out that in today's urban society
most tenants bargain primarily for the right to enjoy the premises for
living purposes. The contemporary urban tenant is not interested in land
but is concerned primarily with the structure on the land. The modern
apartment lease involves the use of space and facilities in a building; the
condition of the building, not the quality of the land, has become the most
important feature of the lease-hold. As the court in Javins said, "Today's
urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live in multiple dwelling houses,
are interested, not in the land, but solely in 'a house suitable for occupa-
tion.' ,s Second, the court concludes that the reasons for the establishment
of an implied warranty in the law of sales and torts are equally persuasive
with respect to apartment leases. The contemporary lessor is required by
statute to provide certain services. The types of services required of the
landlord-heating, electricity and plumbing--are like those usually pur-
chased by contract. Accordingly, it has been said that "the modern lease
more closely resembles a contract for the purchase of space and services than
it does the purchase of an interest in land."3 9 Modern contract law has
recognized that the purchaser of goods and services in an industrialized
35. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 269 (1969).
36. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
37. Id. at -, 462 P.2d at 474.
38. 428 F.2d at 1078.
39. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519, 535 (1965).
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society is forced to rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier. Because
of this forced dependency, an increasing number of decisions have held
manufacturers and sellers liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
and merchantability. Based upon the premise that the public interest de-
mands consumer protection, these cases place the burden of fitness on the
manufacturer who, by marketing goods, impliedly attests to their suit-
ability. The court's third reason for ruling in favor of an implied warranty
of habitability lies in the nature of the present housing market. Today's
urban tenant "usually has a single, specialized skill unrelated to mainte-
nance work; he is unable to make repairs like the 'jack-of-all-trades' farmer
who was the common law's model of the lessee." 40 Moreover, building code
violations uncovered by administrative agencies are not made known to the
lessee. In addition, the lessor "is in a better position to know of latent de-
fects, structural or otherwise, in a building which might go unnoticed by a
lessee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or expertise to see or to discover
them."41 The resultant lack of knowledge is hardly conducive to effective
remedial action on the part of the lessee. Furthermore, the increasing short-
age of housing, racial and class discrimination, and standardized form
leases enable landlords to place tenants in a take it or leave it situation.
Finally, the court interprets the Housing Regulations of the District of
Columbia as a legislative mandate to maintain leased premises in a habitable
condition. Section 2501 of the Housing Regulations states:
Every premises accommodating one or more inhabitants shall be
maintained and kept in repair so as to provide decent living ac-
commodations for the occupants. This part of the code contem-
plates more than mere basic repairs ... to keep out the elements;
its purpose is to include repairs and maintenance designed to make
a premises or neighborhood healthy and safe.
42
The Javins court looked to other jurisdictions where housing code
regulations have been held an integral part of any housing contract. 43 In
addition, District of Columbia courts have held that the Housing Regula-
40. 428 F.2d at 1078.
41. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969).
42. HousING R.FGUATIONS OF Tim DisTuar OF COLUMBIA § 2501 (1967). In addition,
§ 2304 of the Housing Regulations states: "No person shall rent or offer to rent any
habitation, or the furnishings thereof, unless such habitation and its furnishings are
in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair, and free from rodents or vermin."
43. 428 F.2d at 1081. The court cited Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 IIl. 2d 538,
544, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960): "[T]he law existing at the time and place of the
making of the contract is deemed a part of the contract, as though expressly referred to
or incorporated in it." See also Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964);
Gutowski v. Crystal Homes Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 269, 167 N.E.2d 422 (1960).
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dons create legal rights and duties enforceable in tort by private paries4 4
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has said that because of section
2501, a housing contract is void if, at the time of the signing of the lease,
the landlord knew that substantial code violations existed on the premises.4 5
If section 2501 effects the establishment of a housing contract, the court
states, it should not cease to have effect once the contract is signed. "To the
contrary, by signing the lease the landlord has undertaken a continuing
obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all
applicable law." 46 Any private agreement to shift the statutorily imposed
duties would be unenforceable because it would nullify the effect of the
Code which specifically places the duty of maintenance upon the lessor.4 7
The significance of Javins lies in the fact that it is a judicial attempt
to eliminate the discrepancy between legislative policies and urban realities.
The Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia were passed in re-
sponse to the increased need, and recognition of the social desireability, of
adequate housing. The purpose of the Housing Regulations is to insure that
every apartment possesses at least a minimum standard of habitability and
fitness. If a tenant has a statutory right to a "habitable" apartment, he must
have an effective means of enforcing this right. The ineffectual remedies
provided the tenant by the common law have the practical effect of nullify-
ing the "right to habitability." At common law the lessor's breach of a
covenant to repair did not suspend the rental obligation of the tenant. The
tenant could not even abandon the premises, his only remedy was an inde-
pendent suit or counterclaim for damages. In essence, the tenant at common
law had no effective means of compelling the landlord to make repairs.
The constructive eviction doctrine provided the tenant with an additional,
but by no means adequate, remedy. If it could be shown that the covenant
breached by the lessor was of such a substantial nature as to materially
interfere with the intended use of the premises, the tenant could abandon
44. See Kanelos v. Ketfler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher
Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134
N.E. 703 (1922), Judge Cardozo, commenting upon the New York Tenement House Law
(N.Y. Sess. Laws [1901] ch. 334), said:
The legislature must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor
were made by the landlord, they would not be made by any one. The duty
imposed became commensurate with the need. The right to seek redress is not
limited to the city or its officers. The right extends to all whom there was a
purpose to protect.
233 N.Y. at 19, 134 N.E. at 704.
45. Brown v. Southall Realty, 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968).
46. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1081.
47. See W. PRossER, ToRTs § 67, at 468-69 (3d ed. 1964). The precedents dealing
with industrial statutes are in point. See Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
96 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1899).
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and be released from the rental covenant. In addition to procedural prob-
lems,48 the doctrine provided only an escape, not a method of enforcement.
Because of the severe housing shortage, particularly in low income housing,
many tenants do not want to abandon their dwellings, even if they are in
need of serious repair. The tenant wants a means of compelling improve-
ment, not a means of departure. Accordingly, it becomes evident that effec-
tive housing codes are dependent upon a reappraisal of the tenant's
means of enforcement. The decision in Javins is such a reappraisal. "By
adopting the view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship with
an implied warranty of habitability and fitness, a more consistent and re-
sponsive set of remedies are available for a tenant. '49 The basic contract
remedies of damages, reformation and rescission give the tenant a wide
range of alternatives. For example, the tenant can now abandon the prem-
ises, be released from the covenant to pay rent, and recover damages.
Alternatively, the tenant can now remain in possession and pay a rent re-
duced according to the extent of his damages,5 0 or can bring an action for
specific performance and compel the landlord to make necessary repairs.
The Javins case is important because it rejected the common law
doctrine of caveat emptor and held that an implied warranty of habitability
must be read into any apartment lease in the District of Columbia. It is
more important because it held that the implied warranty is a "continuing
obligation" existing for the duration of the lease. It is most important be-
cause it held that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship with statu.
torily imposed covenants, thereby providing the tenant with an effective
means to enforce the legislative mandate of "habitability."
JAMES E. KELLY
48. To prove constructive eviction the tenant must abandon the premises within
a "reasonable time."
49. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, -, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
50. 428 F.2d at 1082-83. "At the trial the finder of fact must have two findings: (1)
whether the alleged violations existed during the period for which past due rent is
claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the tenant's obligation to pay rent was
suspended by the landlord's breach." Id.
